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Abstract
Mean-payoff games (MPGs) are infinite duration two-player zero-sum games played on weighted
graphs. Under the hypothesis of perfect information, they admit memoryless optimal strategies for both
players and can be solved in NP ∩ coNP. MPGs are suitable quantitative models for open reactive
systems. However, in this context the assumption of perfect information is not always realistic. For
the partial-observation case, the problem that asks if the first player has an observation-based winning
strategy that enforces a given threshold on the mean-payoff, is undecidable. In this paper, we study the
window mean-payoff objectives that were introduced recently as an alternative to the classical mean-
payoff objectives. We show that, in sharp contrast to the classical mean-payoff objectives, some of the
window mean-payoff objectives are decidable in games with partial-observation.
1 Introduction
Mean-payoff games (MPGs) [13] are infinite duration, two-player, zero-sum games played on weighted graphs,
useful for modelling reactive systems with quantitative objectives and designing algorithms to synthesize
controllers for such systems [6]. Like other verification games played on graphs, two players move a token
around the graph for an infinite number of steps. One of the players selects a label, after which the second
chooses an edge with this label. The token is then moved along the selected edge. This infinite interaction
between the two players results in an infinite path in the graph. The objective of Player 1 is to maximize
the limiting average payoff of the edges (defined by the weights that annotate them) traversed in this infinite
path, while Player 2 tries to minimize this average. It has been shown in [3,13] that both players in an MPG
can play optimally using memoryless strategies, and as a consequence, those games are known to be solvable
in NP ∩ coNP, and although pseudo-polynomial-time algorithms to solve these games are known [5, 22], the
question of whether they can be solved in polynomial-time is an important open question.
In the version of MPG described above, the game is of perfect information: both players have complete
knowledge of the history of the play up to the current position of the token. For many applications such
as controller synthesis, it is often more natural to assume that players have only partial knowledge of the
current state of the game. In practice, players may model processes with private variables that other players
(processes) may not see, or controllers that acquire information about their environment using sensors with
bounded precision, etc. Unfortunately, it has been shown in [10] that MPGs games with partial-observation
are undecidable.
Window mean-payoff objectives (WMP objectives) were recently introduced in [9] as an alternative to
the classical MP objectives. In a WMP objective instead of considering the long-run average along the
whole play, payoffs are considered over a local bounded window sliding along the play. The objective is
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then to make sure that the average payoff is at least zero over every window. The WMP objectives enjoy
several nice properties. First, in contrast to classical MP games, we have a polynomial-time algorithm for
determining WMP games. Second, they can be considered as approximation of the classical MP objectives
in the following sense: (i) they are a strengthening of the MP objective, i.e. winning for the WMP objective
implies winning for the MP objective, (ii) if a (finite memory) strategy is forcing a MP with value ε > 0
then that strategy is also enforcing the WMP objective for a window size that is bounded by a function of
the game and strategy memory sizes.
In this paper we consider the extension of WMP objectives to games with partial-observation. We show
that, in sharp contrast with classical MP objectives, some of the WMP objectives are decidable for such
games. As in [9], we consider several variants of the window MP objectives. For all objectives, we provide
complete complexity results and optimal algorithms. More precisely, our main contributions are as follows:
• First, we consider a definition in which the window size is fixed and the sliding window is started at
the initial move of the game, this is called the direct window objective. For this definition we give an
optimal EXP-time algorithm (Theorem 3) in the form of a reduction to a safety game. Additionally,
we show that this safety game has a nice structure that induces a natural partial order on game
positions. In turn this partial order can be used to obtain a symbolic algorithm based on the antichain
approach [12]. This shows that WMP objectives allow us not only to recover decidability but they also
lead to games that have the potential to be solved efficiently in practice. The antichain approach has
already been applied and implemented with success for LTL synthesis [4], omega-regular games with
partial observation [2], and language inclusion between non-determinisitic Büchi automata [11].
• Second, we consider two natural prefix-independent definitions for the window objectives, the (uni-
form) fixed window objectives. We also give optimal EXP-time algorithms for these two definitions
(Theorem 5 and Theorem 6), when weights are polynomially bounded in the size of the game arena.
For these objectives, we show that the sets of good abstract plays (sequences of observations) of the
game with partial observation, for the two definitions, form regular languages whose complements
can be recognized by non-deterministic Büchi automata of pseudo-polynomial size (Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3). These automata can then be turned into deterministic parity automata that can be
used as observers to transform the game of partial-observation into a game of perfect information with
a parity objective.
• Finally, we show that, when the size of the window is not fixed but rather left as a parameter, then for
all the objectives that we consider the decision problems are undecidable (Theorem 2).
2 Preliminaries
Weighted game arenas. A weighted game arena with partial-observation (WGA, for brevity) is a tuple
G = 〈Q, qI ,Σ,∆, w,Obs〉, where Q is a finite set of states, qI ∈ Q is the initial state, Σ is a finite set of
actions, ∆ ⊆ Q×Σ×Q is the transition relation, w : ∆→ Z is the weight function, and Obs ∈ Partition(Q)
is a set of observations containing {qI}. Let W = max{|w(t)| : t ∈ ∆}. We assume ∆ is total, i.e. for every
(q, σ) ∈ Q × Σ there exists q′ ∈ Q such that (q, σ, q′) ∈ ∆. If every element of Obs is a singleton, then we
say G is a WGA with perfect information and if |Obs| = 1 we say G is blind. For simplicity, we denote by
postσ(s) = {q
′ ∈ Q | ∃q ∈ s : (q, σ, q′) ∈ ∆} the set of σ-successors of a set of states s ⊆ Q.
In this work, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we depict states from a WGA as circles and transitions as
arrows labelled by an action-weight pair: σ, x ∈ Σ× {−W, . . . ,W}. Observations are represented by dashed
boxes and colors, where states with the same color correspond to the same observation.
Abstract and concrete paths. A concrete path in an WGA is a sequence q0σ0q1σ1 . . . where for all i ≥ 0
we have qi ∈ Q, σi ∈ Σ and (qi, σi, qi+1) ∈ ∆. An abstract path is a sequence o0σ0o1σ1 . . . where oi ∈ Obs,
σi ∈ Σ and such that there is a concrete path q0σ0q1σ1 . . . for which qi ∈ oi, for all i. Given an abstract
path ψ, let γ(ψ) be the set of concrete paths that agree with the observation and action sequence. Formally
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γ(ψ) = {q0σ0q1σ1 . . . | ∀i ≥ 0 : qi ∈ oi and (qi, σ, qi+1) ∈ ∆}. Also, given abstract (respectively concrete)
path ρ = o0σ0 . . . and integers k, l we define pi[k..l] = ok . . . ol, pi[..k] = pi[0..k], and pi[l..] = olσlol+1 . . . .
Given a concrete path pi = q0σ0q1σ1 . . . , the payoff up to the (n+ 1)-th element is given by
w(pi[..n]) =
n−1∑
i=0
w(qi, σi, qi+1).
If pi is infinite, we define two mean-payoff values MP and MP as:
MP(pi) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
w(pi[..n]) MP(pi) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
w(pi[..n])
Plays and strategies. A play in a WGA G is an infinite abstract path starting at oI ∈ Obs where qI ∈ oI .
Denote by Plays(G) the set of all plays and by Prefs(G) the set of all finite prefixes of such plays ending in
an observation. Let γ(Plays(G)) be the set of concrete paths of all plays in the game, and γ(Prefs(G)) be
the set of all finite prefixes of all concrete paths.
An observation-based strategy for Eve is a function from finite prefixes of plays to actions, i.e. λ∃ :
Prefs(G) → Σ. A play ψ = o0σ0o1σ1 . . . is consistent with λ∃ if σi = λ∃(ψ[..i]) for all i. We say an
observation-based strategy for Eve λ∃ has memory µ if there is a set M with |M | = µ, an element m0 ∈M ,
and functions αu : M × Obs → M and αo : M × Obs → Σ such that for any play prefix ρ = o0σ0 . . . on we
have λ∃(ρ) = αo(mn, on), where mn is defined inductively by mi+1 = αu(mi, oi) for i ≥ 0.
Objectives. An objective for a WGA G is a set VG of plays, i.e. VG ⊆ Plays(G). We say plays in VG are
winning for Eve. Conversely, all plays not in VG are winning for Adam. We refer to a WGA with a fixed
objective as a game. Having fixed a game, we say a strategy λ is winning for a player if all plays consistent
with λ are winning for that player. Finally, we say that a player wins a game if (s)he has a winning strategy.
We write V instead of VG if G is clear from the context.
Given WGA G and a threshold ν ∈ Q, the mean-payoff (MP) objectives MPSupG(ν) = {ψ ∈ Plays(G) |
∀pi ∈ γ(ψ) : MP(pi) ≥ ν} and MPInfG(ν) = {ψ ∈ Plays(G) | ∀pi ∈ γ(ψ) : MP(pi) ≥ ν} require the mean-payoff
value be at least ν. We omit the subscript in the objective names when the WGA is clear from the context.
Let ν = a
b
, w′ be a weight function mapping t ∈ ∆ to b ·w(t)−a, for all such t, and G′ be the WGA resulting
from replacing w′ in G for w. We note that Eve wins the MPSupG′(0) (respectively, MPInfG′(0)) objective
if and only if she wins MPSupG(ν) (resp., MPInfG(ν)).
3 Window Mean-payoff Objectives
In what follows we recall the definitions of the window mean-payoff (WMP) objectives introduced in [9] and
adapt them to the partial-observation setting. For the classical MP objectives Eve is required to ensure the
long-run average of all concretizations of the play is at least ν. WMP objectives correspond to conditions
which are sufficient for this to be the case. All of them use as a main ingredient the concept of concrete
paths being “good”. We formalize this notion below.
Given i ≥ 0 and window size bound lmax ∈ N0 = N \ {0}, let the set of concrete paths χ with the good
window property be
GW(ν, i, lmax) = {χ | ∃j ≤ lmax :
w(χ[i..(i + j)])
j
≥ ν}.
As in [9], we assume that the value of lmax is polynomially bounded by the size of the arena.
For the first of the WMP objectives Eve is required to ensure that all suffixes of all concretizations of the
play can be split into concrete paths of length at most lmax and average weight at least ν. The MP objectives
are known to be prefix-independent, therefore a prefix-independent version of this first objective is a natural
objective to consider as well. We study two such candidates. One which asks of Eve that there is some i
such that all suffixes – after i – of all concretizations of the play can be split in the same way as before. This
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Figure 1: Implications among the objectives
q0 q1
Σ,0
Σ,-1
Σ,0
Figure 2: Blind WGA where, for any lmax ∈ N0,
the only possible abstract play is in Fix(lmax) but
not in UFix(lmax).
q0 q1
Σ,-1
Σ,1
Σ,0
Figure 3: Perfect information WGA where Eve
wins both MP objectives but none of the FWMP
or BWMP objectives.
is quite restrictive since the i is uniform for all concretizations of the play. The second prefix-independent
version of the objective we consider allows for non-uniformity.
Formally, the fixed window mean-payoff (FWMP) objectives for a given WGA and threshold ν ∈ Q are
defined below. For convenience we denote by ψ plays from Plays(G) and concrete plays by pi, i.e. elements
of γ(Plays(G)).
DirFix(ν, lmax) = {ψ | ∀pi ∈ γ(ψ), ∀i ≥ 0 : pi ∈ GW(ν, i, lmax)}
UFix(ν, lmax) = {ψ | ∃i ≥ 0, ∀pi ∈ γ(ψ), ∀j ≥ i : pi ∈ GW(ν, j, lmax)}
Fix(ν, lmax) = {ψ | ∀pi ∈ γ(ψ), ∃i ≥ 0, ∀j ≥ i : pi ∈ GW(ν, j, lmax)}
For the FWMP objectives, we consider lmax to be a value that is given as input. Another natural question
that arises is whether we can remove this input and consider an even weaker objective in which one asks
if there exists an lmax. This is captured in the definition of the bounded window mean-payoff (BWMP)
objectives which are defined for a given threshold ν ∈ Q.
UDirBnd(ν) = {ψ | ∃lmax ∈ N0, ∀pi ∈ γ(ψ), ∀i ≥ 0 : pi ∈ GW(ν, i, lmax)}
DirBnd(ν) = {ψ | ∀pi ∈ γ(ψ), ∃lmax ∈ N0, ∀i ≥ 0 : pi ∈ GW(ν, i, lmax)}
UBnd(ν) = {ψ | ∃lmax ∈ N0, ∃i ≥ 0, ∀pi ∈ γ(ψ), ∀j ≥ i : pi ∈ GW(ν, j, lmax)}
Bnd(ν) = {ψ | ∀pi ∈ γ(ψ), ∃lmax ∈ N0, ∃i ≥ 0, ∀j ≥ i : pi ∈ GW(ν, j, lmax)}
As with the mean-payoff objectives we can assume, without loss of generality, that ν = 0. Henceforth,
we omit ν.
3.1 Relations among objectives
Figure 1 gives an overview of the relative strengths of each of the objectives and how they relate to the
mean-payoff objective. The strictness, in general, of most inclusions was established in [9], and Figure 2
provides an example for the remaining case between Fix and UFix.
In general the mean-payoff objective is not sufficient for the FWMP or BWMP objectives, e.g. see
Figure 3. Our first result shows that if, however, Eve has a finite memory winning strategy for a strictly
positive threshold, then this strategy is also winning for any of the FWMP or BWMP objectives. A specific
subcase of this was first observed in Lemma 2 of [9].
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q1 q2 q3
Σ ∪ {#},0
Σ,-1
Σ,-1
#,1
Σ,1
Figure 4: Gadget which forces Eve to play in-
finitely many #.
q4 q5
Σ ∪ {#},0
#,-1
Σ,0
#,1
Figure 5: Gadget which, given that Eve will play
# infinitely often, forces her to play# in intervals
of bounded length.
Theorem 1. Given WGA G, if Eve has a finite memory winning strategy for the MPInf(ε) (or MPSup(ε)) ob-
jective, for ε > 0, then the same strategy is winning for her in the DirFix(µ)G game – where µ is bounded by
the memory used by the strategy.
3.2 Lower bounds
In [9] it was shown that in multiple dimensions, with arbitrary window size, solving games with the (direct)
fixed window objective was complete for EXP-time. We now show that in our more general setting this
hardness result holds, even when the window size is a fixed constant and the weight function is given in
unary.
Lemma 1. Let lmax ∈ N0 be a fixed constant. Given WGA G, determining if Eve has a winning strategy
for the DirFix(lmax), UFix(lmax) or the Fix(lmax) objectives is EXP-hard, even for unary weights.
Proof. We give a reduction from the problem of determining the winner of a safety game with imperfect
information, shown in [7] to be EXP-complete.
A safety game with imperfect information is played on a non-weighted game arena with partial-observation
G = 〈Q, qI ,Σ,∆, Obs〉. A play of G is winning for Eve if and only if it never visits the unsafe state set U ⊆ Q.
Without loss of generality, we assume unsafe states are trapping, that is (u, σ, q) ∈ ∆ and u ∈ U imply that
u = q.
Let w be the transition weight function mapping (u, σ, q) ∈ ∆ to −1 if u ∈ U and all other t ∈ ∆ to 0.
Denote by Gw the resulting WGA from adding w to G. It should be clear that Eve wins the safety game G
if and only if she wins MPInfGw(0), DirFixGw(lmax), UFixGw(lmax), and FixGw(lmax) – for any lmax. That is,
all objectives are equivalent for Gw.
In [9] the authors show that determining if Eve has a winning strategy in the k-dimensional version of
the UDirBnd and UBnd objectives with perfect information is non-primitive recursive hard. We show that,
in our setting, these decision problems are undecidable.
Theorem 2. Given WGA G, determining if Eve has a winning strategy for any of the BWMP objectives is
undecidable, even if G is blind.
Sketch. Our proof is by a reduction from the universality problem of weighted finite automata which is
undecidable [1]. A weighted finite automaton is a tuple N = 〈Q,Σ, qI ,∆, w, F 〉 where F ⊆ Q is a set of
final accepting states. A (accepting) run of the automaton on a word x = σ0σ1 . . . σn ∈ Σ∗ is a sequence
r = q0q1 . . . qn ∈ Q+ such that qn ∈ F and (qi, σi, qi+1) ∈ ∆ for all 0 ≤ i < n. The cost of the run r is
w(r) =
∑n−1
i=0 w(qi, σi, qi+1). If the automaton is non-deterministic, it may have several runs on x. In that
case, the cost of x in N (denoted by N (x)) is defined as the minimum of the costs of all its accepting runs
on x.
The universality problem for weighted automata is to decide whether, for a given automaton N , the
following holds: ∀x ∈ Σ∗ : N (x) < 0. If so, N is universal. Our reduction constructs a blind WGA, GN , so
that:
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q5 qI p 6∈ F
q ∈ F
⊥
N
#,12 #,0
Σ ∪ {#},1
#,12
Figure 6: Blind gadget to simulate the weighted automaton N .
• if N is universal, then Eve has a winning strategy for the objective UDirBnd,
• if N is not universal, then Adam has a winning strategy for the complement of the objective Bnd.
As shown in Fig. 1, UDirBnd ⊆ Bnd and all the other BWMP objectives lie in between those two. So, our
reduction establishes the undecidability of all BWMP objectives at once.
Our reduction follows the gadgets given in Figs. 4–6. When the game starts, Adam chooses to play from
one of the three gadgets. As the game is blind for Eve, she does not know what is the choice of Adam and
so she must be prepared for all possibilities. Note also that as Eve is blind, her strategy can be formalized
by an infinite word w ∈ Σ ∪ {#}ω. The first two gadgets force Eve to play a word w such that: (C1)
there are infinitely many # in w, and (C2) there exists a bound b ∈ N such that the distance between two
consecutive # in w is bounded by b. Note that although (C1) holds with under a mean-payoff objective, the
Bnd objective is necessary to ensure (C2).
Now, we assume that Eve plays a word w = #w1#w2#w3# . . .#wn# . . . that respects conditions C1
and C2, and we consider what happens when Adam plays in the third gadget (Fig. 6). The best strategy
for Adam is to simulate the accepting runs of N . If N is not universal then Eve chooses w1 ∈ Σ∗ such that
N (w1) ≥ 0, and then she plays the strategy (#w1)ω and she wins the objective UDirBnd. Indeed Eve plays
a finite memory strategy that forces a mean-payoff which is at least 0.5
b
> 0 as each new # brings + 12 and
we know that N (w1) ≥ 0. The result then follows from Theorem 1. If N is universal, no matter which word
w is played by Eve, the mean-payoff of the outcome of the game will be at most −0.5
b
as any word w1 ∈ Σ∗
played between two consecutive # is such that N (w1) ≤ −1. Thus, Adam wins for the complement of the
mean-payoff objective. From the relation between the mean-payoff objective and Bnd (see Fig. 1) it follows
that Adam wins for the complement of the objective Bnd.
4 Solving DirFix games
In this section we establish an upper bound to match our lower bound of Section 3.2 for determining the
winner of DirFix games. We first observe that for WGAs with perfect information the DirFix(lmax) objective
has the flavor of a safety objective. Intuitively, a play pi is winning for Eve if every suffix of pi has a prefix
of length at most lmax with average weight of at least 0. As soon as the play reaches a point for which this
does not hold, Eve loses the play. In WGAs with partial-observation we need to make sure the former holds
for all concretizations of an abstract play.
We construct a non-weighted game arena with perfect information G′ from G. Eve’s objective in G′ will
consist in ensuring the play never reaches locations in which there is an open window of length lmax, for
some state. This corresponds to a safety objective. Whether Eve wins the new game can be determined in
time linear w.r.t. the size of the new game (see, e.g. [21]). The game will be played on a set of functions F
which is described in detail below. We then show how to transfer winning strategies of Eve from G′ to G
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and vice versa in Lemmas 5 and 6. Hence, this yields an algorithm to determine if Eve wins the DirFix(lmax)
objective which runs in exponential time.
Theorem 3. Given WGA G, determining if Eve has a winning strategy for the DirFix(lmax) objective is
EXP-complete.
Let us define the functions which will be used as the state space of the game. Intuitively, we keep track
of the belief of Eve as well as the windows with the minimal weight open at every state of the belief.1
For the rest of this section let us fix a WGA with partial-observation G and a window size bound
lmax ∈ N0. We begin by defining the set of functions F as the set of all functions f : Q→ ({1, . . . , lmax} →
{−W · lmax, . . . , 0}) ∪ {⊥}. Denote by supp(f) the support of f , that is the set of states q ∈ Q such that
f(q) 6= ⊥. For q ∈ supp(f), we denote by f(q)i the value f(q)(i). The function fI ∈ F is such that
fI(qI)l = 0, for all 1 ≤ l ≤ lmax, and fI(q) = ⊥ for all q ∈ Q \ {qI}. Given f1 ∈ F and σ ∈ Σ, we say f2 ∈ F
is a σ-successor of f1 if
• supp(f2) = postσ(supp(f1)) ∩ o for some o ∈ Obs;
• for all q ∈ supp(f2) and all 1 ≤ j ≤ lmax we have that f2(q)j maps to max{−W · lmax,min{0, ζ(q)}},
where ζ(q) is defined as follows
ζ(q) =


min
p∈supp(f1),
(p,σ,q)∈∆,
f1(p)j−1<0
f1(p)j−1 + w(p, σ, q) if j ≥ 2
min
p∈supp(f1),
(p,σ,q)∈∆
w(p, σ, q) otherwise.
Lemma 2. The number of elements in F is not greater than 2|Q|·lmax·log(W ·lmax).
We extend the supp operator to finite sequences of functions and actions. In other words, given ρ′ =
f0σ0f1σ1 ∈ (F · Σ)∗, supp(ρ′) 7→ s0σ0s1σ1 . . . where si = supp(fi) for all i ≥ 0. In an abuse of notation, we
define the function supp−1 : (Obs·Σ)∗×F → (F·Σ)∗ which maps abstract paths to function-action sequences.
Formally, given ρ = o0σ0o1σ1 · · · ∈ Prefs(G) and ϕ ∈ F with supp(ϕ) ⊆ o0, supp−1(ρ, ϕ) 7→ f0σ0f1σ1 . . .
where f0 = ϕ and for all i ≥ 0 we have that fi+1 is the σi-successor of fi such that supp(fi+1) ⊆ oi+1. Both
supp and supp−1 are extended to infinite sequences in the obvious manner.
The following two results enunciate the key properties of sequences of the form (F ·Σ)∗. Intuitively, the
set of all those sequences corresponds to the windowed, weighted unfolding of G with information about
reachable states as well as open windows.
Lemma 3. Let ρ = o0σ0 . . . on be an abstract path, ϕ ∈ F such that supp(ϕ) ⊆ o0 and supp−1(ρ, ϕ) =
f0σ0 . . . fn ∈ (F · Σ)∗. A state q ∈ Q is reachable from some state q0 ∈ supp(ϕ) through a concrete path
q0σ0 . . . qn ∈ γ(ρ) if and only if q ∈ supp(fn).
Consider an abstract path ψ and a positive integer n. We say a window of length l is open at q ∈ γ(ψ[n])
if there is some concretization χ of ψ[..n] with q = χ[n] such that χ 6∈ GW(n− l, l).
Lemma 4. Let ρ = o0σ0 . . . on be an abstract path, ϕ ∈ F such that supp(ϕ) ⊆ o0 and supp−1(ρ, ϕ) =
f0σ0 . . . fn ∈ (F · Σ)∗. Given state p ∈ supp(fn) and 1 ≤ l ≤ lmax such that l ≤ n, then there is a window of
length l open at p if and only if fn(p)l < 0.
Formally, the arena G′ = 〈F , fI ,Σ,∆′〉. The transition relation ∆′ contains the transition (f1, σ, f2) if f2
is the σ-successor of f1. Eve, in G
′, is required to avoid states U = {f ∈ F | ∃q ∈ supp(f) : f(q)lmax < 0}.
1The terms belief and knowledge are used to denote a state from any variation of the classic “Reif construction” [18] to
turn a game with partial-observation into a game with perfect information. Other names for similar constructions include
“knowledge-based subset construction” (see e.g. [10]).
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Lemma 5. If Eve wins the safety objective in G′, then she also wins the DirFix(lmax) objective in G.
Proof. Assume λ′ is a winning strategy for Eve in G′. We define a strategy λ for her in G as follows:
λ(ρ) 7→ λ′(supp−1(ρ, fI))
for all ρ ∈ Prefs(G). We claim that λ is winning for her in G. Towards a contradiction, assume ψ ∈ Plays(G)
is consistent with λ and that ψ 6∈ DirFix(lmax). Recall that this implies there are n ∈ N, q ∈ Q such that
there is a window of length lmax open at q ∈ γ(ψ[n]). By Lemma 4 we then get that fn from supp
−1(ψ, fI) =
f0σ0f1σ1 . . . is in U . As supp−1(ψ, fI) is consistent with λ′, this contradicts the assumption that λ′ was
winning.
Lemma 6. If Eve wins the DirFix(lmax) objective in G, then she also wins the safety objective in G
′.
Proof. Assume λ is a winning strategy for Eve in G. We define a strategy λ′ for her in G′ as follows:
λ′(ρ′) 7→ λ ◦ obs ◦ supp(ρ′)
for all ρ′ ∈ Prefs(G′). We claim that λ′ is winning for her in G′. Again, towards a contradiction, assume
ψ′ ∈ Plays(G′) is consistent with λ′ and that ψ′ visits some f ∈ U . This implies, by Lemma 4, that there
is a window of length lmax open at some q ∈ supp(f) in ψ = obs(supp(ψ′)). As ∆ is total, for any σ ∈ Σ
Eve plays then there is valid σ-successor of q that Adam can choose as the next state. Hence there is some
χ ∈ Plays(G) consistent with λ such that χ and ψ have the same prefix up iq, where q ∈ γ(χ[iq]), and there
is a concretization pi of χ such that pi[iq] = q. As χ is consistent with λ and χ 6∈ DirFix(lmax), this contradicts
the fact that it was a winning strategy.
4.1 A symbolic algorithm for DirFix games
We note that state space of the construction G′ presented in Section 4 admits an order such that if a state is
smaller than another state, according to said order, and Eve has a strategy to win from the latter, then she
has a strategy to win from the former. In this section we formalize this notion by defining the order and, in
line with [4, 8], propose an antichain-based algorithm to solve the safety game on G′.
We define the uncontrollable predecessors operator UPre : P(F)→ P(F) as follows:
UPre(S) = {p′ ∈ F | ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∃q′ ∈ S : (p′, σ, q′) ∈ ∆′}.
For S ∈ P(F), we denote by µX.(S∪UPre(X)), the least fixpoint of the function F : X → S∪UPre(X) in the
µ-calculus notation (see [14]). Note that F is defined on the powerset lattice, which is finite. The following
is a well-known result about the relationship between safety games and the UPre operator (see e.g. [15]).
Proposition 1. Eve wins a safety game with unsafe state set U if and only if the initial state of the game
is not contained in µX.(U ∪ UPre(X)).
Definition 1 (The partial order). Given f ′, g′ ∈ F we say f ′  g′ if and only if supp(f ′) ⊆ supp(g′) and
∀q ∈ supp(f ′), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , lmax}, ∃j ∈ {i, . . . , lmax} : f
′(q)i ≥ g
′(q)j .
An antichain is a non-empty set S ∈ P(F) such that for all x, y ∈ S we have x 6 y. We denote by A
the set of all antichains. Given a, b ∈ A, denote by a ⊑ b the fact that ∀x ∈ b, ∃y ∈ a : y  x. For S ∈ P(F)
we denote by ⌊S⌋ the set of minimal elements of S, that is ⌊S⌋ = {x ∈ S | ∀y ∈ S : y  x implies y = x}.
Clearly ⌊S⌋ is an antichain.
Given S ∈ P(F) we denote by S↑ the upward-closure of S, that is S↑ = {t ∈ F | S  t}. We say a
set s ∈ P(F) is upward-closed if S = S↑. Note that ⌊S⌋↑ = S↑ and therefore, if S is upward-closed, the
antichain ⌊S⌋ is a succinct representation of S.
Lemma 7. The following assertions hold.
8
q0
q1
q′1
· · ·
· · ·
qn
q′n
o0
o1 on
Σ,0
Σ,-1
Σ,0
Σ,0
Σ,0
Σ,0
Σ,0
Σ,0
Figure 7: For n > lmax +1 the abstract path (o0 . . . on)
ω is winning for the Fix condition but infinitely often
visits an unsafe state in the construction from Section 4.
1. U is upward-closed.
2. If S, T ∈ P(F) are two upward-closed sets, then S ∪ T is also upward-closed.
The usual way of showing an antichain algorithm works dictates that we now prove the UPre operator,
when applied to upward-closed sets, outputs an upward-closed set as well. Unfortunately, this is not true in
our case. The following example illustrates this difficulty.
Example 1. Consider the WGA from Figure 3 and let lmax = 2. We note that the function f such that
f(q0) = ⊥ and f(q1)1 = 1, f(q1)2 = 0 is in UPre(U). We also have that for the function g such that g(q0) = ⊥
and g(q1)1 = 0, g(q1)2 = 1 we get that f  g. It is easy to verify that g 6∈ UPre(U). Hence, UPre(U) is not
upward-closed.
However, we claim that one can circumvent this issue by ignoring elements from U . Thus we are able to
prove that, under some conditions, UPre does preserve “upward-closedness”.
Lemma 8. Given upward-closed set S ∈ P(F) and f, g ∈ F\U , if f ∈ UPre(S) and f  g, then g ∈ UPre(S).
We define a version of the uncontrollable predecessors’ operator which manipulates antichains instead of
subsets of F .
⌊UPre⌋(a) = ⌊{p′ ∈ F \ U | ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∃q′ ∈ a, ∃r′ ∈ F : (p′, σ, r′) ∈ ∆′ ∧ q′  r′}⌋
Given a, b ∈ A we denote by a⊔b the least upper bound of a and b, i.e. a⊔b = ⌊{q′ ∈ F | q′ ∈ a or q′ ∈ b}⌋.
It is easy to check that (a ⊔ b)↑ = a↑ ∪ b↑ for any a, b ∈ A.
Theorem 4. Given WGA G, Eve wins the DirFix(lmax) objective if and only if {q′I} 6⊒ µX.(⌊U⌋⊔⌊UPre⌋(X)).
5 Solving Fix games
Since Fix games are a prefix-independent version of DirFix games, it seems logical to consider an analogue
of the perfect information game from the previous section with a prefix-independent condition. Indeed, the
reader might be tempted to extend the approach used to solve DirFix games by replacing the safety objective
with a co-Büchi objective in order to solve UFix or Fix games. However, we observe that although Eve
winning in the resulting game is sufficient for her to win the original Fix game, it is not necessary. Indeed, an
abstract play visits states from U infinitely often if and only if for infinitely many i there is a concretization
of the play prefix up to i which violates GW(i, lmax). Nevertheless, this does not imply there exists one
(infinite) concretization of the play which violates GW(i, lmax) for infinitely many i. Figure 7 illustrates this
phenomenon.
For the reasons stated above, we propose to solve Fix games in a different way. We first introduce the
notion of observer. Let A be a deterministic parity automaton.2 We say A is an observer for the objective
V if the language of A is V , i.e. L(A) = V . In [7], the authors show that the synchronized product of G
2We refer the reader who is not familiar with parity automata or games to [21].
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and an observer for V is a parity game of perfect information which is won by Eve if and only if she wins G.
Thus, it suffices to find an algorithm to construct an observer for Fix(lmax) to be able to solve Fix games.
For convenience, we start by describing a non-deterministic machine that accepts as its language the
complement of Fix(lmax). Note that all elements of Fix(lmax) start with the observation {qI} so it suffices to
describe the machine that accepts any word w ∈ (Σ · Obs)ω such that {qI} · w ∈ Plays(G) \ Fix(lmax). The
machine we construct is similar to the one used in [7] to make objectives of imperfect information games
visible. Intuitively, at each step of the game and after Adam has revealed the next observation we will guess
his actual choice of state using non-determinism. Additionally, we shall guess whether or not a violating
window starts at the next step. The state space of the automaton will therefore consist of a single state
from Q, a negative integer to record the weight of the tracked window, and the length of the current open
window.
Formally, letN be the automaton consisting of the state space F = Q×{1, . . . , lmax}×{−W ·lmax, . . . ,−1}∪
{⊥}; initial state (qI , 1,⊥); input alphabet Σ
′ = Σ×Obs; and ∆′′ ⊆ F ×Σ′×F . The transition relation ∆′′
has a transition ((p, i, n), (σ, o), (q, j,m)) if (p, σ, q) ∈ ∆, q ∈ o,
m =


w(p, σ, q) if w(p, σ, q) < 0
n+ w(p, σ, q) if n 6= ⊥ ∧ n+ w(p, σ, q) < 0 ∧ i < lmax
⊥ otherwise,
and
j =
{
i+ 1 if m = n+ w(p, σ, q)
1 otherwise.
We say a state (q, i, n) ∈ F is accepting if i = lmax and n 6= ⊥. The automaton accepts a word x if and
only it has a run (q0, i0, n0) (σ0, o1) (q1, i1, n1) (σ1, o2) . . . on x such that for infinitely many j we have that
(qj , ij , nj) is accepting.
Proposition 2. The non-deterministic Büchi automaton N accepts a word ψ ∈ Plays(G) if and only if
ψ 6∈ Fix(lmax).
At this point we determinize N and complement it to get a deterministic automaton with state space of
size exponential in the size of N yet has parity index that is polynomial w.r.t. the size of Q (see [17,19,20]).
The synchronized product of G and the observer yields a parity game with the same size bounds. The desired
result follows from the parity games’ algorithm and results of [16].
Theorem 5. Given WGA G, determining if Eve has a winning strategy for the Fix(lmax) objective can be
decided in time exponential in W and the size of G.
Corollary 1. Given WGA G with unary encoded weights, deciding if Eve has a winning strategy for the
Fix(lmax) objective is EXP-complete.
6 Solving UFix games
In order to determine the winner of UFix games, we proceed as in the previous section by finding a non-
deterministic Büchi automaton that recognizes the set of bad abstract plays. However, in this case the
situation is more complicated because a bad abstract play might arise from a violation in the uniformity,
rather than because of a concrete path with infinitely many window violations. Figure 2 illustrates this
issue. To overcome this, we first provide an alternative characterization of the bad abstract plays for Eve.
Consider some ψ ∈ Plays(G). We say pi ∈ γ(ψ) merges with infinitely many violating paths if for all i ≥ 0,
there are j ≥ i, k ≥ j + lmax and some χ ∈ γ(ψ[..k]) such that pi[k] = χ[k] and χ 6∈ GW(j, lmax). We refer to
j as the position of the violation and to k as the position of the merge. Our next result formally states the
relationship between concrete plays merging for multiple violations and UFix games.
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Lemma 9. Given WGA G and ψ ∈ Plays(G), there is pi ∈ γ(ψ) merging with infinitely many violating paths
if and only if ψ 6∈ UFix(lmax).
Proof. (⇒) Assume there is a pi ∈ γ(ψ) merging with infinitely many violating paths. We have that there are
two infinite sequences of indices J = {j0, j1, . . . } and K = {k0, k1, . . . } such that jl < jl+1 and jl+ lmax ≤ kl,
for all l ≥ 0, and for which we know that there is concrete path χl ∈ γ(ψ[..kl]) such that χ[jl..jl + lmax]
realizes an open window of length lmax and χl[kl] = pi[kl], for all l ≥ 0. Observe that for all l ≥ 0 we have
that χl · pi[kl..] ∈ γ(ψ) and that χl · pi[kl..] 6∈ GW(jl, lmax). In other words,
∀l ≥ 0, ∃α ∈ γ(ψ), ∃m ≥ l : α 6∈ GW(m, lmax)
which implies that ψ 6∈ UFix(lmax).
(⇐) Assume ψ 6∈ UFix(lmax). We have that there is a infinite sequence of indices J = {j0, j1, . . . }
such that jk < jk+1, for all k ≥ 0, and for which we know there is a concrete play pik ∈ γ(ψ) such that
pik 6∈ GW(jk − lmax, lmax), for all k ≥ 0. Observe that for all i ≥ 0 the set γ(ψ[i]) is finite and bounded by
|Q|. Thus, by Pigeonhole Principle we have that, for all n ≥ 0 there is ηn ∈ {pim | 1 ≤ m ≤ |Q| · n} ⊆ γ(ψ)
which merges with at least n violating paths. Consider an arbitrary η1. If η1 merges with infinitely many
violating paths then we are done and the claim holds. Otherwise it only merges with a finite number of
violating paths, say a1. From the previous argument we know there is an ηa′
1
∈ γ(ψ) that merges with at
least a′1 = a1 + 1. Clearly η1 and ηa′1 are disjoint at every point after a
′
1, lest η1 would merge with a new
violating path. We inductively repeat the process, if ηa′
i
merges with infinitely many violating paths then we
are done. Otherwise it only merges with some finite number of violating paths, say ai. In that case we turn
our attention to ηa′
i+1
. Note that since Q is finite this process can only be done a finite number of times.
Indeed, after having discarded at most |Q| − 1 concrete plays (which are disjoint after some finite point)
it must be the case the last remaining possible concrete play has the desired property or we would have a
contradiction with our assumptions. Thus, there is some concrete play pi ∈ γ(ψ) that merges with infinitely
many violating paths.
We now construct the non-deterministic Büchi automatonN ′ that recognizes plays that contain a concrete
path that merges with infinitely many violating paths. The idea is that we non-deterministically keep track
of two paths: one that will eventually witness a violation and then merge with the other, which ultimately
serves as the witness for the path that merges with infinitely many violating paths. When the two paths
merge, the automaton non-deterministically selects a new path to witness the violation. This is achieved by
non-deterministically selecting any state in the belief set of Eve as these states represent the end states of
any concrete play consistent with the abstract play so far. To avoid the double exponential associated with
taking the Reif construction before determinizing the automaton, we instead compute the belief set on-the-fly
using a Moore machine that feeds into our non-deterministic automaton. By transferring the exponential
state increase to an exponential increase in the alphabet size, the overall size of the determinized automaton
(after composition with the Moore machine) will be at most singly exponential in the size of our game and
W .
More specifically, denote by B the machine that, given ψ = o0σ0o1σ1 · · · ∈ Plays(G) as its input yields
the infinite sequence o0σ0s0o1σ1s1 · · · ∈ (Obs · Σ · P(Q))ω such that s0 = {qI} and for all i ≥ 0 we have
si+1 = postσi(si). One can easily give a definition of B – which closely resembles a subset construction –
with a state space at most exponential w.r.t. G. Observe that the machine realizes a continuous function,
in the sense that every prefix of length i of the input uniquely defines the next si+1 annotation. Thus, the
annotation can be done on-the-fly.
Formally, N ′ consists of the state space F ′ = Q×Q×{1, . . . , lmax}×{−W · lmax, . . . ,−1}∪{⊥,⊤}; initial
state (qI , qI , 1,⊥); input alphabet Σ′′ = Σ × Obs × P(Q); and ∆′′′ ⊆ F × Σ′′ × F . The transition relation
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∆′′′ has a transition ((p, p′, i, n), (σ, o, s), (q, q′, j,m)) if (p′, σ, q′) ∈ ∆, q ∈ s, q′ ∈ o,
m =


w(p, σ, q) if (p, σ, q) ∈ ∆ ∧w(p, σ, q) < 0
n+ w(p, σ, q) if (p, σ, q) ∈ ∆ ∧ n 6= ⊥ ∧ n+ w(p, σ, q) < 0 ∧ i < lmax
⊤ if (p, σ, q) ∈ ∆ ∧ (n 6= ⊤ ∨ p 6= p′) ∧ n 6= ⊥ ∧ i = lmax
⊥ otherwise,
and
j =


lmax if m = ⊤
i+ 1 if m = n+ w(p, σ, q)
1 otherwise.
We say a state (q, q′, i, n) ∈ F ′ is accepting if q = q′, n = ⊤. The automaton accepts a word x if and only it
has a run (q0, q
′
0, i0, n0) (σ0, o1, s1) (q1, q
′
1, i1, n1) (σ1, o2, s2) . . . on x such that for infinitely many j we have
that (qj , q
′
j , ij , nj) is accepting.
Proposition 3. The non-deterministic Büchi automaton N ′ accepts a word α = B(ψ), where ψ ∈ Plays(G),
if and only if ψ 6∈ UFix(lmax).
We recall that determinizing N ′ and complementing it yields an exponentially bigger deterministic au-
tomaton. Its composition with B, itself exponentially bigger, accepts the desired set of plays and is still
singly exponential in the size of the original arena and W . Once more, the desired result follows from the
algorithm presented in [16].
Theorem 6. Given WGA G, determining if Eve has a winning strategy for the UFix(lmax) objective can be
decided in time exponential in W and the size of G.
Corollary 2. Given WGA G with unary encoded weights, deciding if Eve has a winning strategy for the
UFix(lmax) objective is EXP-complete.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. In [10] the authors show that if Eve is only allowed to play finite memory strategies then she wins
the MPInf(ν) game if and only if she wins the MPSup(ν) game, for any ν ∈ Q. We show the claim holds
for MPInf(ε). Let λ∃ = 〈M,m0, αu, αo〉 be the deterministic Moore machine representation of Eve’s finite
memory winning strategy. Consider the product of the arena with Eve’s finite memory winning strategy,
G × M , constructed in the obvious manner, i.e. every path in G × M corresponds to a concrete path
consistent with her strategy. Clearly all cycles in G ×M have weight of at least ε, otherwise Adam can
create a concrete path with mean-payoff value less than ε by “pumping” the cycles with value less than ε.
As any path in G×M corresponds to concrete plays consistent with Eve’s strategy, this contradicts the fact
that the strategy is winning for her. By Pigeonhole Principle we have that for any path in G ×M : if a
window opens at step i, then after i there is a sequence of length at most |M ||Q| − 1 that is not involved in
any cycle. Now, since every cycle has weight ε > 0, after at most
µ =
W · |M ||Q|
ε
· |M ||Q|
steps the window will have closed. It follows that for all ψ ∈ Plays(G) consistent with her strategy:
∀pi ∈ γ(ψ), ∀i ≥ 0 : pi ∈ GW(i, µ)
which concludes our argument.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We provide a reduction from the universality of weighted finite automata which is undecidable [1]. A
weighted finite automaton is a tuple N = 〈Q,Σ, qI ,∆, w, F 〉 where F ⊆ Q is a set of final accepting states.
A (accepting) run of the automaton on a word x = σ0σ1 . . . σn ∈ Σ∗ is a sequence r = q0q1 . . . qn ∈ Q+ such
that qn ∈ F and (qi, σi, qi+1) ∈ ∆ for all 0 ≤ i < n. The cost of the run r is w(r) =
∑n−1
i=0 w(qi, σi, qi+1). If
the automaton is non-deterministic, it may have several runs on x. In that case, the cost of x in N (denoted
by N (x)) is defined as the minimum of the costs of all its accepting runs on x.
The universality problem for weighted automata is to decide whether, for a given automaton N , the
following holds:
∀x ∈ Σ∗ : N (x) < 0.
We construct a blind WGA, GN , so that:
• if N is universal, then Eve has a winning strategy for the objective UDirBnd,
• if N is not universal, then Adam has a winning strategy for the complement of the objective Bnd.
As shown in Fig. 1, UDirBnd ⊆ Bnd and all the other BWMP objectives lie in between those two. So, our
reduction establishes the undecidability of all BWMP objectives at once.
Our reduction follows the gadgets given in Fig. 4-5-6. When the game starts, Adam chooses to play from
one of the three gadgets. As the game is blind for Eve, she does not know what is the choice of Adam and
so she must be prepared for all possibilities. Note also that as Eve is blind, her strategy can be formalized
by an infinite word w ∈ Σ ∪ {#}ω. Let us show first that the two first gadgets force Eve to play a word w
such that:
(C1) there are infinitely many # in w, and
(C2) there exists a bound b ∈ N such that the distance between two consecutive # in w is bounded by b.
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Assume that Eve plays a word w = #w1#w2#w3# . . .#wn# . . . that respects conditions C1 and C2,
with each wi ∈ Σ∗. First, if Adam decides to play in the first gadget (Fig. 4), then either Adam stays in state
q1 forever, and he does not open any window, or he decides at some point to go from q1 to q2, whereupon he
does open a window. However, after at most b steps Adam has to leave q2 for q3 at the next occurence of the
# symbol, the bound b is guaranteed by C2. After at most b additional steps, the open window will be closed
as the self loop on q3 is labeled with the weight +1. So in this case, Eve wins the objective UDirBnd. Second,
if Adam decides to play in the second gadget (Fig. 5), then he can go from q4 to q5 on the # symbols. The
windows that open on those transitions will all close within b steps according to condition C2 and the game
moves back to q4. So again, Eve wins for the objective UDirBnd.
Now assume that Eve plays a word w that violates either condition C1 or condition C2. First, if w violates
C1, then Adam chooses the first gadget (Fig. 4), and just after Eve has played her last #, Adam moves from
q1 to q2. As there will be no # anymore, Adam can loop on q2 and the window that he has opened will
never close. Hence, Adam wins for the complement of the objective Bnd. Second, if w violates C2 then there
exists an infinite sequence of indices i1 < i2 < · · · < in < . . . such that |wi1 | < |wi2 | < · · · < |win | < . . . .
Then Adam can read this sequence of sub-words using runs of the form q4(q5)
∗q4. Each such run will open
a window that closes at the end of the sub-word. But as the sequence of lengths of the sub-words is strictly
increasing and infinite, Adam wins for the complement of the objective Bnd.
Now, we will assume that Eve plays a word w = #w1#w2#w3# . . .#wn# . . . that respects conditions
C1 and C2, and we consider what happens when Adam plays in the third gadget (Fig. 6). As we will see, in
this gadget, the best strategy for Adam is to simulate the accepting runs of N .
Assume first that automaton N is non-universal. Then by definition, there exists a finite word w1 ∈ Σ
∗
such that all accepting runs of N on w1 have a non-negative value, i.e. N (w1) ≥ 0. In that case, w = (#w1)ω
is a finite memory winning strategy for Eve for the objective Bnd. Indeed, if Adam simulates accepting runs
on w then the mean-payoff of the outcome is at least 0.5
b
> 0 as each new # brings + 12 and we know
that N (w1) ≥ 0. So Eve wins for the objective UDirBnd by Theorem 1, as Eve obtains a strictly positive
mean-payoff bounded away from zero with a finite memory strategy. Now, if Adam chooses not to follow
accepting runs then the game ends up in state ⊥ from which the mean-payoff is equal to 1, so we can conclude
using similar arguments that Eve wins for the objective UDirBnd. Thus in all these cases, Eve wins for the
objective UDirBnd.
Finally, assume that automaton N is universal and let us show then that Adam has a winning strategy
for the complement of the Bnd objective. Indeed, if Eve plays a word w = #w1#w2#w3# . . .#wn# . . .
that respects conditions C1 and C2, then we know that N (wi) < 0 for each i ≤ 0. On such word, Adam can
follow accepting runs in the gadget of Fig. 6. As the length between two consecutive # is at most b, we know
that the mean-payoff of the run constructed by Adam is less than or equal to −0.5
b
. It follows that Adam
wins the complement of the Bnd objective as claimed, as Bnd objective implies the mean-payoff objectives
(as shown in Fig. 1 ).
C Missing proofs from Section 4
Lemma 2. The number of elements in F is not greater than 2|Q|·lmax·log(W ·lmax).
Proof.
|F| ≤ (W · lmax)
|Q|·lmax
=
(
2log(W ·lmax)
)|Q|·lmax
= 2|Q|·lmax·log(W ·lmax).
Lemma 3. Let ρ = o0σ0 . . . on be an abstract path, ϕ ∈ F such that supp(ϕ) ⊆ o0 and supp−1(ρ, ϕ) =
f0σ0 . . . fn ∈ (F · Σ)∗. A state q ∈ Q is reachable from some state q0 ∈ supp(ϕ) through a concrete path
q0σ0 . . . qn ∈ γ(ρ) if and only if q ∈ supp(fn).
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Proof. (⇒) We proceed by induction. We will show that for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n, for all qj ∈ supp(fj) there is
a concrete path q0σ0 . . . qj such that qk ∈ ok for all 1 ≤ k ≤ j and q0 ∈ supp(ϕ). Note that for j = 0
the claim trivially holds. Assume the claim holds for j. From the definition of σ-successor and supp−1 we
have that supp(fj+1) = postσj (supp(fj)) ⊆ oj+1. This means that for all qj+1 ∈ supp(fj+1) there must be
some qj ∈ supp(fj) such that (qj , σj , qj+1) ∈ ∆. Hence any qj+1 is reachable from some qj via σj which, by
inductive hypothesis, is in turn reachable from some q0 ∈ supp(ϕ) via a concrete path of the desired form.
(⇐) We now show – once more by induction on j – that for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n, if there is a concrete path
q0σ0 . . . qj such that q0 ∈ supp(ϕ) and qk ∈ ok for all 1 ≤ k ≤ j, then qj ∈ supp(fj). The claim holds for j = 0.
Assume that it holds for some j. From the assumptions we have that (qj , σj , qj+1) ∈ ∆ and qj+1 ∈ ok+1.
Further, we know that qj ∈ supp(fj) by inductive hypothesis. Hence, qj+1 ∈ postσj (supp(fj)) ⊆ oj+1 which
means that qj+1 ∈ supp(fj+1).
Lemma 4. Let ρ = o0σ0 . . . on be an abstract path, ϕ ∈ F such that supp(ϕ) ⊆ o0 and supp−1(ρ, ϕ) =
f0σ0 . . . fn ∈ (F · Σ)∗. Given state p ∈ supp(fn) and 1 ≤ l ≤ lmax such that l ≤ n, then there is a window of
length l open at p if and only if fn(p)l < 0.
Instead of directly providing a proof of Lemma 4, we prove a more general result below. Consider the
three conditions stated in Lemma 10. We shall prove that that C1⇒ C2⇒ C3⇒ C1. Since C1 corresponds
to having a window of length l open at p from supp(ϕ), the desired result follows from transitivity.
Lemma 10. Let ρ = o0σ0 . . . on be an abstract path, ϕ ∈ F such that supp(ϕ) ⊆ o0 and supp−1(ρ, ϕ) =
f0σ0 . . . fn ∈ (F · Σ)
∗. Given state p ∈ supp(fn) and 1 ≤ l ≤ lmax such that l ≤ n, let λ = n − l. The
following three statements are equivalent.
C1. There is a concrete path q0σ0 . . . qn ∈ γ(ρ) with qn = p and q0 ∈ supp(ϕ) and
m∑
j=n−l
w(qj , σj , qj+1) < 0
for all n− l ≤ m < n.
C2. fn(p)l < 0.
C3. There is a concrete path q0σ0 . . . qn ∈ γ(ρ) with qn = p and q0 ∈ supp(ϕ) such that
(a) fj(qj)j−λ < 0 for all λ < j ≤ n, and
(b) fk(qk)j−λ + w(qk, σk, qk+1) = fk+1(qk+1)k−λ+1 for all λ < k < n.
Proof. (C3⇒ C1)We will apply induction onm. From the definition of σ-successor we have that fλ+1(qλ+1)1 =
min{0, w(qλ, σλ, qλ+1)}. From assumption (a) we know that fλ+1(qλ+1)1 < 0. Thus, the claim holds for
m = λ. Assume it holds for m. To conclude the proof, we now show that the claim holds for m+ 1 as well.
m+1∑
j=n−l
w(qj , σj , qj+1) = fm(qm)m−λ + w(qm, σm, qm+1) ind. hyp.
= fm(qm)m−λ+1 from (b)
< 0 from (a).
(C1 ⇒ C2) We show, by induction on m, that for all λ ≤ m < n
fm+1(qm1)m−λ+1 ≤
m∑
j=λ
w(qj , σj , qj+1).
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The desired result follows. As the base case, consider m = λ and note that by definition of σ-successor we
have that
fλ+1(qλ+1)1 = min({0} ∪ {w(p, σλ, qλ+1) | p ∈ supp(fλ) ∧ (p, σλ, qλ+1) ∈ ∆})
≤ w(qλ, σλ, qλ+1).
Thus the claim holds. Assume that the claim is true for m. From the definition of σ-successor we have that
fm+2(qm+2)λ−m+2 ≤ fm+1(qm+1)m−λ+1 + w(qm+1, σm+1, qm+2).
From the inductive hypothesis we get have that the right hand side of the inequality is equivalent to
m+1∑
j=λ
w(qj , σj , qj+1).
Thus the claim holds for m+ 1 as well.
(C2 ⇒ C3) We inductively construct a concrete path q0σ0 . . . qnγ(ρ) with qn = p and q0 ∈ supp(ϕ) such
that
(1) fn−k(qn−k)l−k < 0 for all 0 ≤ k < l, and
(2) fn−k(qn−k)l−k = w(qn−k+1, σn−k+1, qn−k) + fn−k+1(qn−k+1)l−k+1 for all 1 ≤ k < l.
As these conditions are equivalent to (a)-(b) from C3, the result follows. Note that for k = 0 we have that
(1) holds trivially since p ∈ supp(fn) and fn(p)l < 0 by hypothesis. If fn−k(qn−k)l−k < 0 then, by definition
of σ-successor, it follows that there is some q′ ∈ supp(fn−k+1) ⊆ on−k+1 such that fn−k+1(q′)l−k+1 < 0 and
fn−k(qn−k)l−k = w(qn−k+1, σn−k+1, qn−k) + fn−k+1(qn−k+1)l−k+1. In other words, q
′ is the source of the
minimal σn−k+1-transition of a state from supp(fn−k+1) to qn−k. Let qn−k+1 = q
′. Continue in this fashion
defining every qi up to qn−l. Now, from Lemma 3, we have that qn−l is reachable from some state in supp(ϕ)
via a concrete path of the desired form. Any such path is a valid prefix for the sequence qn−lσn−l . . . qn we
constructed above.
Lemma 8. Given upward-closed set S ∈ P(F) and f, g ∈ F\U , if f ∈ UPre(S) and f  g, then g ∈ UPre(S).
Proof. We have that for all σ, there is hσ ∈ S such that (f, σ, hσ) ∈ ∆′. By construction of ∆′ we also know
that there is iσ such that (g, σ, iσ) ∈ ∆′, and furthermore, since supp(f) ⊆ supp(g), we get that
supp(hσ) = postσ(supp(f)) ∩ o
⊆ postσ(supp(g)) ∩ o
= supp(iσ)
for some o ∈ Obs. Note that:
(1) since f, g 6∈ U , then f(p)lmax = g(p)lmax = 0 for all p ∈ supp(f); and
(2) iσ(q)1 = hσ(q)1 for all q ∈ supp(hσ).
From (1) and since f  g, there is a function α : {1, . . . , lmax} → {1, . . . , lmax − 1} such that for all
1 ≤ x < lmax we have that α(x) ≥ x and f(p)x ≥ g(p)α(x) holds for all p ∈ supp(f). Observe that for all
q ∈ supp(hσ) and any 2 ≤ x ≤ lmax, we have that
hσ(q)x = min
p∈supp(f)
({0} ∪ {f(p)x−1 + w(p, σ, q) | f(p)x−1 < 0}
≥ min
p∈supp(f)
({0} ∪ {g(p)α(x−1) + w(p, σ, q) | g(p)α(x−1) < 0}
≥ iσ(q)α(x−1)+1.
It follows that hσ  iσ and that, since S is upward-closed, iσ ∈ S. Thus, we have shown that for all σ, there
is iσ ∈ S such that (g, σ, iσ) ∈ ∆′, which implies that g ∈ UPre(S).
D Proof of Theorem 4
Lemma 11. Given upward-closed set S ∈ P(F), ⌊UPre⌋(⌊S⌋) = ⌊UPre(S) \ U⌋.
Proof. We first show that if f ∈ ⌊UPre⌋(⌊S⌋) then f ∈ UPre(S) \ U . We have that f 6∈ U and ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∃q′ ∈
⌊S⌋, ∃r′σ ∈ F : (f, σ, r
′
σ) ∈ ∆
′ and q′  r′σ. Since S is upward-closed and q
′  r′σ, we know that r
′
σ ∈ S.
Hence, we get that ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∃r′σ ∈ S : (f, σ, r
′
σ) ∈ ∆
′, which implies that f ∈ UPre(S) \ U .
Next, we show that if f ∈ ⌊UPre(S) \ U⌋ then f ∈ {p′ ∈ F \ U | ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∃q′ ∈ a, ∃r′ ∈ F : (p′, σ, r′) ∈
∆′ and q′  r′}. We know that f 6∈ U and ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∃r′ ∈ Q : (f, σ, r′) ∈ ∆′. By definition of ⌊S⌋, we know
there is qr′ ∈ ⌊S⌋ such that qr′  r′. Thus, we get that ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∃r′σ ∈ S, ∃qr′ ∈ ⌊S⌋ : (f, σ, r
′) ∈ ∆′ and
qr′  r′.
Finally, we note that if f ∈ ⌊UPre⌋(⌊S⌋) then not only is it true that f ∈ UPre(S) \ U , but furthermore
f ∈ ⌊UPre(S) \ U⌋. Indeed, if this were not the case, then there would be g ∈ ⌊UPre(S) \ U⌋ such that g  f
and f 6= g. Then, by the argument explained in the previous paragraph, this would contradict minimality
of f in ⌊UPre⌋(⌊S⌋). Similarly, if f ∈ ⌊UPre(S) \ U⌋ then f ∈ ⌊UPre⌋(⌊S⌋), as otherwise, by the argument
from the first paragraph of the proof, minimality in the first set would be contradicted. Thus, the claim
holds.
Theorem 4. Given WGA G, Eve wins the DirFix(lmax) objective if and only if {q′I} 6⊒ µX.(⌊U⌋⊔⌊UPre⌋(X)).
Proof. We note that for any upward-closed set S ⊆ F such that U ⊆ S we have, from Lemma 8 that
U ∪ UPre(S) is again upward-closed and a superset of U . In fact, it holds that
U ∪ UPre(S) = (⌊U⌋ ⊔ ⌊UPre(S)⌋)↑
= (⌊U⌋ ⊔ ⌊UPre⌋(⌊S⌋)↑ from Lemma 11.
It is easy to show by induction that µX.(U ∪ UPre(X)) =
(
µX.(⌊U⌋ ⊔ ⌊UPre⌋(⌊X⌋))
)
↑. Thus, {q′I} 6⊒
µX.(⌊U⌋ ⊔ ⌊UPre⌋(⌊S⌋)) if and only if qI 6∈ µX.(U ∪UPre(S)). From Proposition 1 and Lemmas 5 and 6 we
know this is the case if and only if Eve has a winning strategy in the safety game in G′ if and only if she
wins the DirFix(lmax) objective in G.
E Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (⇒) Assume N accepts ψ. Let r = (q0, i0, n0)(σ0, o1)(q1, i1, n1)(σ1, o2) . . . be one of the accepting
runs of the automaton on ψ. By construction of N we have that q0σ0q1σ1 · · · ∈ γ(ψ). Let pir denote this
concrete play and J = {j0, j1, j2, . . . } be an infinite set of indices such that jk < jk+1 and (qjk , ijk , njk) is
accepting for all k ≥ 0. Such a sequence is guaranteed to exist since r is accepting. One can easily verify by
induction on the definition of ∆′′ that for all k ≥ 0 it holds that pir 6∈ GW(ijk − lmax, lmax). It follows that
∀m ≥ 0, ∃n ≥ m : pir 6∈ GW(n, lmax), which concludes our argument.
(⇐) Assume that ψ = o0σ0o1σ1 · · · 6∈ Fix(lmax). Let pi = q0σ0q1σ1 ∈ γ(ψ) be the concrete play such
that for infinitely many i it is the case that pi 6∈ GW(i, lmax). We describe the infinite run of N on ψ that
accepts. Let J = {j0, j1, j2, . . . } be an infinite set of indices such that jk+ lmax < jk+1 and pi 6∈ GW(jk, lmax)
for k ≥ 0. The sequence is guaranteed to exist because of our choice of pi. Observe that this implies there
is a run r = (q0, i0, n0) (σ0, o1) (q1, i1, n1) (σ1, o2) . . . of the automaton where for all k ≥ 0 we have that
njk+1 = w(qjk , σjk , qjk+1) and for all 1 < l < lmax then
njk+l = njk+l−1 + w(qjk+l, σjk+l, qjk+l+1).
Furthermore, in this run it holds that for all k ≥ 0 we have ijk+lmax = lmax. Hence, said run is such that
for all k ≥ 0 the state (qjk+lmax , ijk+lmax , njk+lmax) is accepting. We conclude that the automaton accepts
ψ.
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F Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (⇒) Assume N ′ accepts α. Let r = (q0, q′0i0, n0) (σ0, o1, s1) (q1, q
′
1i1, n1) (σ1, o2, s2) . . . be one of the
accepting runs of the automaton on α. By construction of N ′ we have that q′0σ0q
′
1σ1 · · · ∈ γ(ψ). Let pir
denote this concrete play, J = {j0, j1, . . . } and K = {k0, k1, . . . } be two infinite sets of indices such that
jl < jl+1 and jl + lmax ≤ kl, for all l ≥ 0, and for which we know that
• (qkl , q
′
kl
, ikl , nkl) is accepting for all l ≥ 0, and
• njl+lmax < 0 ∧ ijl+lmax = lmax.
Such sequences are guaranteed to exist since r is accepting. Assuming the correctness of B, one can easily
verify by induction on the definition of ∆′′′ that for all l ≥ 0 we have that pir, at kl merges with a path
having a violation at jl. It follows that pir merges with infinitely many violating paths. From Lemma 9 we
get that ψ 6∈ UFix(lmax).
(⇐) Assume that ψ = o0σ0o1σ1 · · · 6∈ UFix(lmax). Let pi = q0σ0q1σ1 ∈ γ(ψ) be the concrete play that
merges with infinitely many violating paths (see Lemma 9. We describe the infinite run of N on α = B(ψ)
that accepts. Let J = {j0, j1, . . . } and K = {k0, k1, . . . } be two infinite sets of indices such that jl < jl+1 and
jl+lmax+1 < kl, for all l ≥ 0, and for which we know that there is some χl ∈ γ(ψ[..kl]) such that pi[kl] = χl[kl]
and for all jk < m ≤ jk+ lmax+1 we have w(χ[jk..m]) < 0. The sequences are guaranteed to exist because of
our choice of pi. Observe that this implies there is a run r = (q0, q
′
0i0, n0)(σ0, o1, s1)(q1, q
′
1i1, n1)(σ1, o2, s2) . . .
of the automaton where for all l ≥ 0 we have that njl+1 = w(qjl , σjl , qjl+1) and for all 1 < b < lmax then
njl+b = njl+b−1 + w(qjl+b, σjl+b, qjl+b+1).
Furthermore, we have that njl+b = ⊤ for all lmax ≤ b ≤ kl and qkl = q
′
kl
. Hence, said run is such that for all
l ≥ 0 the state (qkl , q
′
kl
, ikl , nkl) is accepting. We conclude that the automaton accepts ψ.
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